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The costs of population ageing are primarily reflected in larger expenditures on pensions
and health care. This paper explores the consequences of ageing for the Netherlands in a
baseline scenario simulated with a dynamic general equilibrium model. We discuss the
sensitivity of the results under alternative projections for population ageing. We explore also
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retirement age and smoothing of the public pension premium over time. We find that the
welfare effects of ageing and the reforms are substantial.
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1. Introduction
All OECD countries will be confronted with an ageing population. For some
countries, the peak in the number of elderly people will occur earlier than for other
countries and for some countries the share of the elderly in the total population will
be higher at its peak than for other countries. Nevertheless, the demographic pattern
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will be broadly the same for all these countries. This shift in the age composition 1
of the population will have far-reaching consequences for economic growth and the
intergenerational distribution. The increase in the dependency ratio will erode the
base of taxes and social security contributions, which requires either a substantial
increase in contribution rates or a reform of social security.2
These scenarios raise a number of questions. How reliable is the projected increase
in the tax burden of the current social security systems? What are the expected
welfare costs of maintaining these systems for current and future generations? What
options exist for a reform of social security to counter a projected rise in the excess
burden? What will be the effect of these measures for the intra-generational
distribution and, in particular, the low-income households?
A large number of studies have appeared that address these questions. Most
studies use an overlapping generations (OLG) framework to disaggregate the
household sector by age (exceptions are Cutler et al., 1990, and Turner et al., 1998).
A particularly useful approach is the method of intergenerational accounting,
introduced by Auerbach et al. (1991). A recent article by Kotlikoff and Leibfritz
(1999) compares the intergenerational accounts for a large number of countries.
From this study, it appears that most countries face serious deficits in the second
quarter of this century, resulting in a substantial generational imbalance.
For the Netherlands, Ter Rele (1998) estimates that the tax burden of future
generations needs to rise only a few percentage points, due to a future increase in
labour participation and the substantial funding of Dutch pensions. In line with the
method of intergenerational accounting, this assumes an equal burden for all unborn
generations. Van Ewijk and Ter Rele (1999) explore the consequences of this policy
for the government budget. It appears that this implies a substantial budgetary
surplus for the government for the next three decades.
In comparison with generational accounting, applied general equilibrium (AGE)
models with overlapping generations offer a much larger scope of policy options.3
Auerbach et al. (1989) is an early study that uses an AGEyOLG model to explore
the consequences of ageing for saving and factor prices. They too find a substantial
increase in the burden of future generations. In addition, the model predicts a sizable
decline in the interest rate and an increase in the real wage, providing a partial
compensation to young generations for the increase in tax rates. On the normative
side, the authors compare the welfare effects of a number of policies and show that
a cut in social security benefits most generations, although the current old generations
De Beer and de Jong (1998) provide demographic projections for the countries in the European
1
economic area.
For example, Gokhale et al. (1999) estimate that for the United States to balance the budget of the
2
social security and medicare funds an immediate and permanent increase by 15.8% of the income tax
rate is needed, keeping real federal purchases constant.
There is no need to assume an equal tax burden for unborn generations, which is not a useful
3
benchmark anyway, as it does not imply an equal distribution of welfare, considering that factor prices
respond to shifts in the supply of labour. In addition, a general equilibrium model takes the welfare
effects of ageing for existing generations into account. Most importantly, it enables us to take into
consideration the rise in the excess burden that results from the demographic shift.989 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Fig. 1. Dependency ratio of number of 65 years and older divided by number of 20–64 years old (%).
suffer. Miles (1999) updates the analysis for the UK and Europe as a whole, with
similar conclusions.
By cutting unfunded social security, the government provides households with an
incentive to increase their private savings to replace pension benefits by capital
income. The efficiency gains of this policy arise from two sources, namely the
tighter linkage between contributions and benefits and the higher rate of return of
funded systems in an era without population growth. This policy is, therefore,
similar to a privatization of social security, as discussed in Feldstein (1998). The
drawback of this reform is that during the transition period some generations have
to contribute both to the unfunded social security system and for the funded one.
To reduce the adverse distributional consequences of pension reform for existing
generations, therefore, requires a transition period, which reduces the effectiveness
of the system.
This raises the question under what conditions a Pareto improving reform of
social security is possible. Theoretical research by Raffelhuschen (1993) and Breyer ¨
and Straub (1993) has shown that a necessary condition is that the reform removes
or reduces a prior existing distortion. Broer et al. (1994) provide an example of
such a Pareto improving reform in an AGEyOLG model of the Dutch economy.
Typically, these reforms rely on a broadening of the tax base, together with the use
of debt to shift part of the burden of the reform between generations.
The case for a broadening of the tax base is also borne out by studies into the
determinants of labour supply of older workers. Gruber and Wise (1997) survey
the relation between social security and labor force departure in a number of
countries. They conclude that in many countries social security operates de facto as
an early retirement scheme. The Netherlands provide a particularly striking example
of the size of the distortions involved for elderly workers. Kapteyn and De Vos990 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Table 1
Assumptions for the three ageing scenarios
Fertility Life expectancy Immigration Emigration
Baseline M M M M
Grey L H L L
Green H L H H
Note:M s‘middle’, Ls‘low’, Hs ‘high’.
(1998) show that the combined effects of different social security schemes create
an implicit tax of over 100% for workers aged over 60.
These insights are also adopted by the European Commission (2001, p. 91),
which sketches three broad strategies to deal with the future costs of ageing: (1) a
rapid reduction of the public debt, (2) an increase in the labour supply and (3)
social security reform. Whether these policies can effect a Pareto-improving reform
is doubtful, however. Kotlikoff et al. (1998), Fehr (1999) and Broer (2001) show
that with intragenerational heterogeneity a Pareto-improving transition is difficult to
achieve. Different income groups are affected differently by alternative financing
modes of the reform and are characterised by different tax-benefit linkages.
In this paper we use an AGEyOLG model to assess the budgeting and economic
consequences of population ageing for the Netherlands and to evaluate the possible
effects of currently debated reforms. We consider, in particular, the effects of
different demographic scenarios on the spread of the tax burden and the intergen-
erational distribution of welfare. Fig. 1 exhibits, for three different scenarios, the
projected dependency ratios of the number of people of 65 years and older, divided
by the number of 20–64 years old. Under the baseline scenario, this dependency
4,5
ratio (to be denoted by D65q) rises rapidly from 22% in 2001 to a peak of
approximately 43% in 2038. After the peak, the dependency ratio falls slightly, but
it remains structurally high at a level of approximately 40%. Roughly speaking, the
projected pattern is the result of the baby-boom shortly after the Second World War
combined with a projected fertility rate of 1.7 children per woman and a moderate
increase in (projected) life expectancy. The baby boom is responsible for the slight
peak towards the end of the thirties of this century, while the low fertility rate and
the high life expectancy together cause the number of elderly to remain high.
The other two population scenarios are based on different assumptions about
fertility and life expectancy (see Table 1). Under the ‘grey’ scenario, primarily
6
As a way to illustrate the ageing pattern of the population, this measure is preferred to the number
4
of 65 years and older as a share of the total population. The reason is that the group of 20–64 years
old contains almost all of those who are in the labour force, which is the group that has to bear the
(financial) burden associated with an ageing population.
The projections were computed in 1998 by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for the period
5
1999–2100.
Immigration and emigration also play a role (see Table 1). The average immigrant is younger than
6
the average person in the total population. Hence, more immigration dampens population ageing. More
emigration also reduces the seriousness of population ageing, because a lot of emigrants are elderly
non-residents who return to their home country.991 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
driven by a projected lower fertility rate and a stronger increase in life expectancy,
D65q rises steeply until it reaches a peak of 52% in 2040. After the peak, it falls
marginally and then resumes its rise, to reach a level of 57.5% in 2100. Under the
‘green’ scenario, which is based on exactly the opposite developments for fertility
and life expectancy, D65q attains a maximum of 36% in 2037 and then falls back
and stabilises at a level of approximately 27.5%, still 5.5% points above the current
value for D65q.
The grey and the green scenarios are rather extreme outcomes and are unlikely
to materialise. Hence, it is likely that actual population developments will remain
between these two extremes. As these alternative projections suggest, the finding
7
that population ageing is a very long-lasting, rather than a temporary phenomenon
seems rather robust against the underlying assumptions about fertility and life
expectancy (see also De Beer, 1999, and De Beer and Beetsma, 1999).
The welfare costs of an ageing population are primarily caused by the increase
in unfunded pensions and the greater demand for health care. To explore the
opportunities for a reduction of the costs of ageing we investigate a number of
policy options. In particular, we investigate three reform measures: a 10% reduction
in public pension benefits, an increase in the retirement age by 2 years and
smoothing of the public pension contribution rate over time. The three types of
reform have different intergenerational redistributive implications. The benefits for
future generations are largest in the case of contribution rate smoothing and smallest
when the retirement age is increased by 2 years. Our simulations suggest that
increasing the retirement age is relatively less attractive (at least for the Netherlands)
than sometimes claimed (see European Commission, 2001, page 94).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
model on which the simulations are based. Section 3 discusses the budgetary and
economic projections for the baseline scenario. Section 4 investigates the effects of
alternative population projections, while Section 5 explores the consequences of the
three alternative reform scenarios. Finally, Section 6 concludes the main body of
this paper. The Appendix contains the values of the important parameters.
2. The model
The simulations are based on the model of Broer (1999), which in turn is an
extension of the model developed by Broer and Westerhout (1997). The Broer
(1999) model is a dynamic general equilibrium representation of a small open
economy (the Netherlands). The model contains eight sectors and four markets. The
sectors are the households, private enterprises that produce tradables, private health
insurance firms, a health care sector, public health insurance wbasic health care and
AWBZ (special medical treatments—see below)x, a pension sector (basic and
supplementary pensions), a government sector and a foreign sector. The markets are
the labour market, the tradeable goods market, the market for health care and the
The area between the green and the grey scenarios corresponds closely to the 95% confidence
7
intervalobtained with simulations at the CBS (see Alders, 2001): they find that there is a 95% chance
that D65q lies between 33% and 52% in 2040.992 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
capital market. Wages and the price for health care are domestically determined,
while the prices for tradables and capital are determined on world markets. The
capital and output markets are perfectly integrated into the world market. Labour,
however, is perfectly mobile across sectors, but completely immobile across borders.
The population has an overlapping generations structure with individual death
hazards that increase with age. Individuals not only differ by age, but within each
generation they also differ in terms of their productivity and, therefore, their income.
In other words, there is both inter- and intra-generational heterogeneity in the model.
The heterogeneity implies that the important ratios, e.g. the savings ratio, labour
productivity and labour participation, are all affected by changes in the age
composition. To incorporate these effects, the model is calibrated on the actual, non-
steady-state, demographic projection.
2.1. Firms
The model distinguishes a number of sectors of private business, viz., the tradable
sector, the health care sector, private health insurance firms, public health insurance
firms, and AWBZ insurance firms. Firms in the tradable goods sector maximise the
present value of dividends, net of taxes and social security contributions. Changes
in the capital stock are subject to adjustment costs. Firms issue debt in a fixed
proportion to the value of their capital, so that the marginal source of finance is
retained earnings. The production function is characterised by a two-layer (nested)
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) structure. The first layer is a CES function
Fw.x of raw materials and value added. The second layer is a CES function Gw.x of
capital and (effective) labour. Domestically-produced tradables are perfect substitutes
of foreign goods. Although workers differ by age and skill type, all sources of
labour input are perfectly substitutable. The production function may be written as
1 2 wx ysFM , Hy cIyK (1) I 2
wx HsG K,L (2) eff
1 t
t L s 1qa hi , t ytL t , t ; i di (3) Ž. Ž . Ž . eff 0 0 | 8
0 t sy` 0
where y denotes final goods production, M materials, H value added, I investment,
K capital, and L labour supply in efficiency units. Finally, L(t, t ; i) is the number eff 0
of type-i households born in period t and still alive in period t. The second term 0
in Eq. (1) represents internal adjustment costs, which affect the short-run interna-
tional mobility of physical capital. h(i, t) denotes the exogenous productivity of a
household of type i and age t.t is the generation index. Even though all labour is 0
perfectly substitutable, the age composition of the working population does matter,
since middle-aged workers have the highest productivity. For a given size of the
work force, labour supply in efficiency units, therefore, increases if the average age993 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
of the population increases. Finally, technological progress is purely labour aug-
menting at rate a.
The market value of the firm V follows from the portfolio decisions of investors.
It is assumed that the marginal investor is a working-age domestic household.
8
Investment is financed through retained earnings and debt. With perfect capital
markets, the arbitrage equation reads as
Vt q1 yVt D i vt Ž . Ž. Ž.
q 1ytt s 1yttr t (4) ŽŽ . . ŽŽ . . Ž . dk Vt Vt Ž. Ž.
where t is the comprehensive dividend tax rate (including the basic pension d
premium and the AWBZ premium) and Div denotes dividends. The right-hand side
9
of the equation represents the alternative return on bonds for young households,
where t is the comprehensive capital income tax rate (including the basic pension k
premium and the AWBZ premium) and r is the world real interest rate. Integrating
Eq. (4) backwards gives the expression for the market value of firms. The firms
are owned by working-age domestic households.
Firms in the health care sector and the insurance sectors use a fixed-coefficients
technology, which requires only labour input. For example, for the health care sector
the required labour input is:
¯ Lt sz ty t (5) Ž. Ž. Ž. zz z
where y sc qc qc denotes demand for health care from privately insured zZ PZ Fa
households, publicly insured households, and AWBZ care, respectively (see below).




Households are distinguished by age and by productivity. The productivity
distribution is exogenous but varies by age. Let the productivity distribution be
denoted by P(h, t), where h denotes productivity and t age. It is assumed that the
productivity ranking of households is invariant by age (i.e. no cross-overs), so that
productivity h defines a household type i according to its position in the distribution,
isP(h, t).
Each householdyindividual has an age-dependent probability of dying in a given
period. Let L(t, t ) denote the proportion of people of generation t that survive to 00
at least age t, then the death hazard of a person of generation t and age t is l(t, 0
t )s1yL(tql, t )yL(t, t ). This death hazard typically rises with age at an 00 0
This assumption is required to achieve shareholder unanimity, as a consequence of the different
8
income tax rates for pensioners and working-age households.
In 2001 the Dutch tax system, in particular taxation of capital income, was reformed. These changes
9
are not incorporated in this version of the model.
In the sequel, variables that are indexed only by t, denote aggregate (average) variables or variables
10
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increasing rate. Households maximise their expected lifetime utility over the
consumption of goods, health care and leisure, subject to their lifetime budget
constraint and a constraint for the available amount of time in each period. The
expected utility of a person of generation t at time t is given by 0
` Lt yt q1,t Ž. 00 1 tyt 1y1yg 1qb u t,t (6) Ž. Ž . 0 8 1y1ygL tyt q1,t Ž. 00 tst
where g denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and b the rate of time
preference. The utility flow u(t, t ) depends on current consumption of goods c, 0
consumption of leisure v, and consumption of health care c.Consumption of goods z
is separable from leisure and health care, usu(c, c (u v, u c )) where both u(.,.) vv z z
and c (.,.) are CES functions of their arguments. The preference coefficients u and v v
u depend on both time and age, in such a way that the demand for leisure and z
health care increases with age to match the observed consumption profiles of both
categories. Households divide the available time (l ) between leisure, health care max
and labour l,
lt , t sl yvt , t yct , t (7) Ž. Ž. Ž. 0m a x 0 z 0
This formulation implies that the opportunity costs of time are an important
component of the costs of consumption of health care.
Households insure themselves against their death risk by bequeathing their
remaining assets to an insurance company that pays them a return on their assets as
long as they are alive. In terms of the taxes and social security contributions they
have to pay, we need to distinguish households along the following dimensions:
young and old (i.e. whether they have a pension income or not), whether they are
covered by public or private health insurance (public insurance is mandatory below
a certain income level) and whether they accumulate supplementary pensions (high
income) or not (low income). Young households sell their shares upon reaching the
retirement age as a result of tax arbitrage (see footnote 8).
The dynamic budget restriction for a household is as follows
11
At q1,t s 1q 1yttr tA t , tql t,t A tq1,t Ž . Ž Ž Ž . . Ž . . Ž. Ž. Ž . 0 k 00 0
y q 1ytt yp t,t p t,t l t,t yp t,t ŽŽ .Ž . . Ž Ž . Ž . Ž . . y 0 l 00 FC 0
q 1ytt y t , tqyt , t yp t,t Ž Ž ..Ž Ž . Ž .. Ž . yF C 0 PAYG 0 Z 0
qTt , t y 1qttc t , t (8) Ž. Ž Ž . . Ž. 0 c 0
Here, A denotes financial assets, t denotes the tax rate on non-capital income y
and p denotes the PAYG contribution rate. Households of age 65 and older do not
y
pay pension contributions, so p is zero for old generations. The first term on the
y
right-hand side of Eq. (8) represents after-tax capital income. The second term
represents after-tax annuity income from the life insurance fund. Life insurance pays
a fraction l(t, t ) of end-of-period assets, which corresponds to the bequests left to 0
In order not to burden the notation unnecessarily, we leave out the reference to the productivity
11
type. However, all decision variables and the wage rate are dependent on the type of the household.
The complete equations are given in Broer (1999), Eqs. (30)–(32).995 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
the fund by the fraction of households that dies at the end of period t. The third
term denotes the after-tax labour income (with p (t,t )sp (t)h(tyt ) the wage l 0 l 0
earned by the household per unit of time spent working). Contributions to the
occupational pension fund p are deductible from labour income, while the benefits FC
later in life are taxable at the then going rate (the first term in line three). yFC
denotes the benefits from the occupational fund and y denotes the benefits PAYG
received from PAYG social security. p denotes the contributions to the health Z
insurance sector. The effects of the pension system and the health care system on
marginal tax rates are discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Finally, T denotes transfers
and t denotes the consumption tax rate. c
It is assumed that the maximum age a household can reach is 100, i.e. l(99,
t )s1. In the absence of a bequest motive, the lifetime budget constraint may then 0
be written as A(100, t )s0 Due to a lack of data, the distribution of assets over 0
existing generations at the start of the simulation period is assumed to equal the
steady-state distribution. Households maximise expected lifetime utility, given by
Eq. (6), subject to their lifetime budget constraint and the time constraint, Eq. (7).
2.3. The pension system
The pension sector is characterised by two (complementary) schemes. The first
is a public pension scheme (AOW), which operates on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
basis. It provides a flat, minimum benefit to any person of 65 years or older. The
scheme is financed through levies on labour and capital income of those younger
than 65 years. Those who are 65 years or older are exempt from AOW contributions.
Budgetary balance of the PAYG fund requires adjusting the contribution rate p
y
each period so that
yy yt N t sp tpt L t yP t qyt (9) Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. . PAYG ol eff FC K
where N denotes the number of elderly, the total labour supply of those under
y L o eff
65 years in efficiency units, P the total contributions to the occupational pension FC
scheme and y the aggregate capital income of young households (excluding capital K
gains).
The occupational scheme supplements the AOW for retired households who
previously enjoyed wages above the social minimum. The scheme is funded and its
benefits are based on the final pay and the number of contribution years. Contribu-
tions to this supplementary pension scheme are levied on labour income if it exceeds
a certain threshold (the franchise). These contributions are deductible for income
tax and AOW contributions. However, the benefits will be subject to income
taxation.
Contributions to the occupational fund per participating household are given by
wz
x| p t,t ,i swtmax pt , t,i yf t ,0 l t,t ,i (10) Ž.Ž . Ž. Ž . Ž. FC 0 l 00 y~
where f(t) denotes the franchise and w(t) the contribution rate. The payment, like
the contribution, is in excess of the franchise. It is based on the final wage, and the996 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013




x yt , t ,i s max ptqn ,t ,i Ž. Ž . FC 0 l 0 y 0 y ptqn Ž. l 0 y
t qn y1 0 y
z
| yftqn, 0 a c l t,t ,i xt ,t ,i (11) Ž. Ž . Ž . 0 y 0 FC 0 ~ 8
tst0
The first term on the right-hand side covers the wage indexation of the benefits.
The second term checks whether the final wage exceeds the franchise at the statutory
retirement age, n . Finally, ac denotes the accumulation rate of pension rights, while y
the last term gives the number of contribution years.
Regulations in the Netherlands require that occupational pension funds hold
sufficient capital to cover the projected benefit obligations accumulated thus far.
The present value of benefit obligations can be obtained from future pension
payments, assuming that no further contributions to the fund are made. Denote
13
the projected benefit obligation by PBO(t). Then, the pension contribution rate w(t)
is determined by the requirement that
lFC BE PBO tq1 PBO t Ž. Ž . CF At q1 sAt (12) Ž. Ž . FC FC
DG PBO tA t Ž. Ž. FC
where A denotes the assets of the occupational pension fund, FC
1 t
At q1 s 1qrt A tq p t,t ,i yyt , t ,i di (13) Ž. ŽŽ . . Ž . ŽŽ. Ž. . FC FC FC 0 FC 0 | 8
0 t sy` 0
We use l s0.1 to represent the lagged adjustment of contribution rates to FC
changes in returns. It follows that the path of the contribution rate depends not only
on current contributions and benefits, but also on future wages and interest rates.
The future development of the contribution base plays a role only in so far as it
affects wages.
2.4. The health insurance sector
Contributions to the health insurance system depend on the income level of the
household. Low-income (i.e. low-productivity) households are publicly insured.
They pay a contribution p (t) which is proportional to their labour income, as ZF
well as a small nominally fixed contribution. The public health insurance system,
which operates on a PAYG basis, reimburses nearly all health care expenditures.
Higher-income households are privately insured. They pay a lump sum contribution
p (t). The private health care system reimburses a fixed proportion of the health P
care expenditures of their clients. Within the public health insurance sector there is
also a second scheme (the AWBZ), to which both publicly and privately insured
x (t, t , i) equals unity if household i contributed to the fund in year t, and zero otherwise.
12
FC 0
For the actual expression, see Broer (1999), Eq. (80).
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households contribute. The AWBZ provides coverage for special medical treatments.
For young households, the contributions to the health insurance system are specified
as
Sp ty t , t qp tyt , tqyt , t for pt , t-gt Ž. Ž . Ž. Ž Ž . Ž . . Ž . Ž. ZF L 0A W B Z L 0 K 0 l 0 ZF T
U p t,t s (14) Ž. Z 0 T
p t qp tyt , tqyt , t for pt , t)gt Ž. Ž. Ž Ž . Ž . . Ž . Ž. V P AWBZ L 0 K 0 l 0 ZF
yt , tspl t,t l t,t yp t,t qTt , t Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. L 00 0 FC 00
where p denotes the AWBZ contribution rate and g the public health AWBZ ZF
insurance income threshold. The important point about the contribution to the
14
health insurance system is that it acts as a distortionary tax that is higher for low-
wage households.
Health insurance funds adjust the contribution rates to balance their budget each
period. For the public health insurance fund, this requires that p (t) be set so that ZF
expenditures equals income, where the latter is obtained by multiplying p (t) by ZF
the contribution base of publicly insured households, and adding any subsidies from
the government. The contribution rate is, therefore, nearly proportional to the
average consumption of health care services by households, and as a result it will
tend to rise with the average age of the insured households. Other insurance funds
operate in a similar way.
2.5. The government
The productive activities of the government consist of education and general
government. Both activities require only labour, in fixed proportions per skill type,
as input. The amount of education to be provided for a given household is
exogenous, but age-dependent. Labour input required for general government is
proportional to the population size. Other expenditure categories for the government
are interest payments on public debt, disability insurance payments, transfers to
households, transfers to foreigners and the public health insurance subsidy. Disability
insurance payments depend on the (exogenous) age–disability profile. The public
health insurance subsidy is proportional to reimbursements for health care by the
public health insurance sector. Transfers to households are linked to population size
and net wages, while transfers to foreigners are linked to population size and
productivity growth. On the revenue side the government disposes of income taxes
(labour income, interest income and dividend), indirect taxes and corporate taxes.
The government achieves budgetary balance by adjusting the income tax rate to
maintain a constant debtyGDPratio.
3. Simulation results
The simulations are based on the national accounts (and other data) for 1999.
Except for population growth, the calibration uses a steady-state growth path for all
Retired households remain with the fund they were insured with the last year of their working life.
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Fig. 2. Labour participation rate of 18–64 year old (%).
exogenous variables for the period after 1999. All the simulations (except for those
based on the ‘grey’ or ‘green’ scenarios—see Section 4) use the baseline population
projection, as shown in Fig. 1. The simulations based on the alternative demographic
projections are implemented after a re-calibration of the model. The calibration for
the other scenarios is identical to that of the baseline. The simulations of the model
are run until 2200 (in order to attain a steady state), under the assumption that the
population composition remains constant as of 2101.
The variants we discuss below all assume that the public debtyGDPratio and the
(world) real interest rate are held constant at 58% and 5%, respectively. The income
tax rate acts as the closure variable for the intertemporal government budget
constraint. In other words, the income tax rate is endogenous, while the other tax
rates are exogenous. The social security contribution rates (AOW, public health care
and AWBZ) are endogenous, because they adjust to balance the corresponding
budgets.
3.1. The baseline case
The labour participation rate, measured as the share of the total amount of time
available to 18–64 years old that is spent on working, falls from 62.4% in 2001 to
a minimum of 60.1% in 2024 (see Fig. 2). The participation rate in the labour
15
force is driven by several factors. First, the working-age population itself grows
older and older workers have lower participation rates, ceteris paribus. Second, there
is an intratemporal substitution effect from goods consumption to time-related
consumption (health care and leisure), caused by the increase in the tax and
This figure excludes participation increases arising from social and cultural trends that are not a
15
result of policy changes; see the projections in CBSyCPB (1997).999 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Fig. 3. AOW as a share of GDP (%).
contribution wedge. Finally, the growing wedge reduces the net future income. This
implies a fall in individual wealth, which stimulates the labour supply. Apparently,
this last effect is too small to offset the other two effects in the run-up to the ageing
peak.
The projections, thus, show that the costs of population ageing have to be borne
by the falling share of the population that actually works. This is, in particular, the
case for schemes that are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Such schemes are
balanced on a year-by-year basis. Hence, any disbursements in a year have to be
matched by levying contributions from working households.
Indeed, as Fig. 3 reveals, AOW (public pension) contributions as a share of GDP
rise from 5.3% in 2001 to a peak of 9.8% in 2039. After having reached their peak,
they fall slightly and remain at a level of approximately 9%. The steep increase in
the AOW contribution rate is the result of two factors that work in the same
direction. First, the number of public pensions to be paid out rises relative to the
number of people in the labour force. Second, the distortions that arise from the
contribution rate increases (not only AOW, also other social security contributions)
lead to reduced labour participation rates, as described above. In effect, the pattern
of the AOW contribution closely follows the projection of D65q.
Fig. 4 depicts the public health sector as a share of GDP. The public health sector
is defined as the sum of the public health expenditures and the AWBZ expenditures.
It follows a time pattern that is very similar to that projected for the AOW. The
pattern arises from the fact that the elderly demand more health care than the
average population member. The public health sector as a share of GDPincreases
from 7.3% in 2001 to a maximum of 10.5% in 2040.
The projected contribution rate for supplementary pensions rises during the first
two decades of this century (see Fig. 5). The reason is that supplementary pension
benefits are indexed to the wage rate, which increases as a result of the fall in the1000 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Fig. 4. Public health sector as a share of GDP (%).
Fig. 5. Supplementary pension premium (%).
labour supply. However, the increase in the contribution rate is very moderate:
approximately 1 percentage point between 2001 and 2020. The reason is that the
pension funds already own a substantial amount of assets (105% of GDPin 2001 ),
because they are legally required to be able to cover the (discounted) accumulated
pension rights of those already participating in the fund. In the event of a mismatch
between pension assets and projected pension obligations (for example, as a result
of a wage rise), the gap between these two will be closed at an assumed rate of
10% a year.1001 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Fig. 6. Total taxes as a share of GDP (%).
Fig. 7. Savings, investment, current account and trade balance as shares of GDPin the baseline (%).
Total taxes as a share of GDP (Fig. 6) rise from 26.8% in 2001 to a peak of
29.2% in 2037. This change can largely be attributed to higher consumption tax
16
revenues. While income tax revenues fall during the coming 2 decades (following
the fall in the labour supply), consumption tax revenues rise sharply, because
consumption as a share of GDPincreases substantially. This increase is in line with
the ageing pattern of the population. The total collective sector as a share of GDP
is computed by adding AOW (Fig. 3), the public health sector (Fig. 4) and total
These figures, thus, exclude AOW and the contributions paid to the public health sector.
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tax revenues (Fig. 6). It increases by approximately 10 percentage points, from
39.4% in 2001 to a peak of 49.4% in 2039.
Fig. 7 shows national savings as a share of GDP. National savings is defined as
the sum of private and public sector savings. Over the coming years the national
savings rate will rise marginally to a maximum of 25.9% in 2008, after which it
declines until it reaches a minimum of 16.4% in 2045. This fall in savings is
explained by the increase in the number of old people that draw from their private
pensions. The elderly reduce their (pension) wealth, thereby reducing national
savings. Investment as a share of GDP (also depicted in Fig. 7) falls by 17
approximately 1.7 percentage points between 2001 and 2028, when this ratio reaches
its lowest level. This fall is primarily the result of a shift of labour to sectors that
use no capital (the health care and health insurance sectors).
The fall in investment and the initial increase in the savings rate are reflected in
an improvement in the current account, which rises from 9.3% in 2001 to 10.5% in
2010. After 2010, the current account starts falling until it attains a minimum of
0.9% in 2045. The first three decades of the fall are driven by the falling savings
rate, which dominates the falling investment rate. After 2028, investment picks up
again, which, together with a savings rate that is still falling, causes the current
account to deteriorate further. Consumption smoothing over time is reflected in the
trade balance. The accumulation of foreign assets allows a deficit on the trade
balance, starting in 2020. In the long run, interest earnings on foreign assets finance
the trade balance deficit of 5.5%.
Fig. 8 displays the average (over productivity types) relative compensating
variations for generations born at different points in time. The relative compensating
variation of a particular generation is defined as the percentage increase in its
(remaining) lifetime wealth needed to ensure that it experiences the same lifetime
utility, corrected for technological progress, as the base generation, which is the one
that enters (at age 18) the labour market in 1999. The correction is needed because
on a steady-state growth path the utility of future generations will be higher as a
result of technological progress. The time-profile of the relative compensating 18
variations is, thus, a way to illustrate the intergenerational distribution of the costs
of population ageing. Indeed, along a steady state growth path wwhich requires a
constant population composition by age (and skills)x, the relative compensating
variations will be equal to zero for all generations.
All generations that entered the labour market before 1999 are better off than the
one that entered in 1999, because these older generations need to contribute (or
have contributed) less to the costs of population ageing, while all the younger and
future generations contribute more and are worse off. Fig. 8 makes clear that the
The increase in the number of public pensions and the increase in the demand for health by the
17
old do not have a direct effect on national savings, because these schemes are financed on a pay-as-
you-go basis.
The correction is obtained by premultiplying generation t’s utility by a factor (1q
18
a) , where t is the year in which the generation enters the labour market, as0.02 and
1999yt y 1y1yg () ()
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Fig. 8. Compensating variations, relative to 1981 generation (%).
relative compensating variations and, hence, the implicit intergenerational redistri-
bution caused by population ageing are large (5.3% in the long run).
4. Alternative scenarios for exogenous variables
The model has been re-calibrated for two alternative population projections, the
‘grey’ and the ‘green’ scenarios (see Fig. 1). As mentioned in the Section 1, the
grey scenario is primarily driven by assumptions about a favourable development
of the life expectancy and a further reduction in fertility rates. The green scenario
is based on exactly the opposite assumptions. We explore these two, rather extreme
scenarios, because there is quite a lot of uncertainty about the future demography.
These alternative scenarios provide us with an idea about the size of the implied
deviations of key variables from their baseline paths. In addition, when contemplating
policy adjustments in response to adverse demographic developments, there may
well be a case for ‘playing safe’ and implementing policies that are robust against
a substantially worse outcome of the ageing problem than under the baseline
projection. This is especially important if one realises that the effectiveness of many
policy responses increases, the further they are taken before the peak in the
population ageing.
4.1. The ‘grey’ scenario
The implications of the grey scenario are straightforward. The increase in the
average age of the labour force reinforces the fall in the labour participation rate1004 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
(Fig. 2). This development is exacerbated by the additional increase in the wedge
between the gross and the net wage. Relative to the baseline, AOW as a share of
GDPkeeps on rising over the entire time horizon (Fig. 3). By the end of the
century it exceeds its baseline level by more than 17 percentage points. The
contribution rate for the supplementary (private) pension (Fig. 5) initially exceeds
its baseline value by 2 percentage points. The difference is gradually reduced and
stabilises at a level that is approximately 0.7 percentage points above the baseline
path. The initial increase in the contribution rate for the supplementary pension
results from a mismatch between pension assets and pension obligations. Next to
the increase in life expectancy, obligations rise because the future fall in the labour
supply boosts wages. With pensions of a defined-benefit nature, the obligations
towards those that have already retired or that have entered the labour market before
1999 rise. In the long-run, the contribution rate for the supplementary pension
remains above its baseline level, because of the permanently lower labour supply.
The other major change implied by the grey scenario concerns the public health
sector (Fig. 4), which, as a share of GDP, exceeds its baseline projection at the end
of the century by 1.9 percentage points.
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The salient feature of the grey scenario is the dramatic increase in the excess
burden of future generations, as shown in Fig. 8. In the long run, the welfare loss
is more than 30% of lifetime income. This would imply that for the next few
decades, the increase in income due to technical progress is largely annihilated by
the increase in the tax burden. In comparison with the base scenario, the much
larger increase in the excess burden indicates that the social security system is
stretched to its limit in this scenario, so that a reform becomes inevitable.
4.2. The ‘green’ scenario
The green scenario contrasts with the grey scenario in that life expectancy does
not increase and fertility does not fall. AOW payments as a share of GDPsteadily
fall over time relative to the baseline (see Fig. 3), although they rise in absolute
terms during the coming decades. After reaching a peak in 2038, the share settles
on a declining trend for the remainder of the century. Nevertheless, it always
remains substantially above its current level. The contribution rate for the supple-
mentary pension (Fig. 5) immediately drop by 2%-points as a result of the initial
mismatch between assets and obligations. Afterwards, it rises more than in the base
scenario, but it stays at a lower level permanently. Similar to the AOW social
security contributions, the size of the public health sector increases (Fig. 4), although
it remains smaller than under the baseline. As in the other demographic scenarios,
A problem with both the ‘grey’ and the ‘green’ scenario is that public health expenditures already
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deviate in the base year from the baseline scenario. This discrepancy results from an interpretation
problem with the calibration of forward-looking models. Changing the life expectancy of a household
will affect, through wealth effects, the consumption path over the lifecycle. In principle, a parameter
from the utility function could have been varied to maintain initial health expenditures at the level of
the base scenario. However, we prefer to keep utility parameters the same over the scenarios. The
downside of this choice shows up in different starting levels of public health expenditure.1005 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
labour supply as a share of the working age population falls during the first two
decades and starts rising again after 2024 (see Fig. 2). It stabilises above the
baseline path.
In terms of the intergenerational burden, the green scenario carries a lower burden
of social security and health care, but a higher burden of education and investment
to match the increase in the work force. This change implies a substantially different
intergenerational welfare distribution. Fig. 8 shows that under the green scenario the
intergenerational distribution is fairly flat. Future generations are better off than in
the base scenario, as they profit from lower health care contributions and a higher
return of the PAYG public pension fund, due to the higher growth rate of the
population (Aaron, 1966). In contrast to the grey scenario, old generations are not
necessarily better off than current young generations. They do not only face the
increase in tax rates, necessary to finance the increase in education expenditures,
but they also profit less from the future decline in social security and health care
contributions.
5. Social security reforms
We have seen that the contributions for AOW and the public health sector are
expected to rise steeply in the coming decades. Given their PAYG nature, these
contributions are the source of substantial intergenerational redistribution effects. In
addition, the growth of the public sector, combined with the distortionary character
of these contributions, gives rise to efficiency losses.
In this section we explore three types of social security reform. They all reduce
the efficiency losses associated with the financing of the ageing of the population.
The first measure is a 10% cut in public pension (AOW) benefits. The ensuing
shift from public to private pension provision reduces the marginal wedge on labour
income. The second measure is an increase in the retirement age by 2 years. The
final type of reform is the smoothing over time of the AOW contribution rate. A
constant contribution rate reduces the discounted value of the efficiency losses.
5.1. A reduction in public pension benefits
Under this scenario, we assume a 10% reduction in AOW benefits. Relative to
the baseline, the reduction in AOW as a share of GDPincreases from 0.50
percentage points in 2001 to 0.83 percentage points in 2039, when the share of
AOW in GDPis largest (see Fig. 9). The reduction in the AOW contribution rate
is to some extent replaced by an increase in the contribution rate for supplementary
pensions. However, the contribution rate for the supplementary pension is less
distortionary than the AOW contribution rate, because, in contrast to AOW benefits,
the size of the future pension benefits is positively related to the contributions. The
contribution rate for the supplementary pension rises as households with productivity
above the franchise level are compensated for the fall in AOW benefits with an
increase in supplementary pension benefits. The resulting discrepancy between the1006 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Fig. 9. AOW revenues as a share of GDPunder Social Security reform (%).
Fig. 10. Labour participation rates of 18-64 years old under Social Security reform (%).
pension fund’s projected benefit obligations and its assets has to be closed by an
increase in the contribution rate for the supplementary pension. This increase
diminishes over time, as the gap between obligations and assets is reduced.
The lower AOW contribution rate reduces the marginal wedge for workers and,
hence, stimulates the labour supply (Fig. 10), although the effect is very small. Fig.
11 reports the welfare effects of the pension reform. In particular, it shows the
average percentage increase in the remaining lifetime wealth needed to restore utility
to its level under the baseline. The reform benefits currently young and future1007 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Fig. 11. Compensating variations for Social Security reform relative to the baseline (%).
generations. These generations all profit from the reduced deadweight loss. However,
the other generations lose from the reform. In particular, the currently retired fail to
benefit from the fall in the AOW contribution rate, because they are exempt from
AOW contributions. Yet, those with productivity below the franchise level receive
lower AOW benefits, without any compensation in the form of higher supplementary
pension benefits.
5.2. An increase in the statutory retirement age
An increase in the statutory retirement age is often advocated (e.g. by the
European Commission, 2001) as an effective way to deal with the costs of population
ageing. Therefore, in this simulation, we raise the age at which individuals become
eligible for AOW by two years, for all generations younger than 40 in 1999. Hence,
older current generations are not directly affected by the policy reform (although
they are indirectly affected through general equilibrium effects). Fig. 9 depicts a
substantial drop in the AOW benefits (srevenues) in 2025 and 2026. Individuals
remain eligible for a supplementary pension as of their 65th birthday. However, the
abolishment of AOW for the 65 and 66 years old is assumed not to be compensated
for by an increase in their supplementary pension.
The welfare effects of the reform (relative to the baseline) are summarised in
Fig. 11. The losers are the generations born in the periods 1960–1984. These1008 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Fig. 12. Wedge on labor income.
generations pay AOW contributions for two more years, while they receive AOW
benefits only from their 67th birthday onwards instead of from their 65th as under
the baseline. The efficiency gains produced by the reform are not sufficient to
compensate these generations. Younger generations or those born in the future are
net beneficiaries of the reform (y0.5%).
On the basis of OECD-simulations, the European Commission (2001),p .9 4 )
suggests that ‘«delaying retirement is a more efficient way to improve the financing
situation of pensions than reductions in benefits levels’. Our simulations allow for
a comparison of these reforms in terms of overall welfare effects. The sum of the
present value of the compensating variations arising from the reduction in AOW
benefits is y13.4 billion Euro, whereas total AOW spending decreases with 75.5
20
billion Euro (discounted at 5%), Hence, the welfare gain equals 18 cents per Euro
reduction in AOW benefits. In contrast, the lagged implementation of the higher
retirement age combines a smaller efficiency gain of y0.8 billion Euro with smaller
savings on AOW outlays of 39.9 billion Euro. This implies a welfare gain of only
2 cents per Euro. The beneficial implications of a higher retirement age (relative to
a reduction in AOW benefits) seem to be much smaller (at least for the Netherlands)
than sometimes suggested. Intuitively, this result derives from the lagged implemen-
tation of the reform. The deferred increase in the retirement age maintains the
original tax distortions till 2025. This is illustrated in Fig. 12, where the wedge on
labor income is defined as:
This sum is not simply equal to the surface under the curve in Fig. 11. In each period the
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compensating variation of an individual is multiplied with the size of its generation and discounted at
5%.1009 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
1qtc wedges (15) y 1y t qp qp qp Ž. yZ F AWBZ
Both reforms lead to a similar wedge in the long run but the decrease of the
benefits immediately reduces distortions. A second explanation stems from the
adverse announcement effects that result from deferred reforms. As is evident from
Fig. 10, young households anticipate the lower tax burden that arises when the
higher retirement age becomes effective. Compared to the case of a reduction in
pension benefits, labour supply is lower prior to the reform, and peaks at the date
of implementation. The deadweight loss of this substitution effect diminishes the
favorable effects of the reform.
5.3. AOW contribution rate smoothing
Relative to the baseline projection, AOW contribution smoothing redistributes
resources from current workers to future workers. Hence, the costs associated with
population ageing will be more evenly spread out over the generations. In addition,
contribution rate smoothing also minimises the distortionary intertemporal substitu-
tion effects of the increasing burden of social security.
The AOW contribution rate is held constant at a level of 11.4%. This is the
constant rate that intertemporally balances the public pension system. It implies an
initial increase of 3.4 percentage points relative to the baseline rate in 2001. During
the first 2 decades, the AOW contribution rate remains above the baseline projection
and the AOW buffer fund will be accumulating assets. After that, the baseline
contribution rate exceeds the rate under smoothing for two reasons. First, the
revenue on the accumulated assets in the initial decades will be spread out over the
entire horizon. Second, the reduction in efficiency losses in the economy allows an
additional reduction in the contribution rate. Fig. 10 shows that labour participation
is initially lower than in the baseline scenario, as a result of the initial increase in
the contribution rate. In later years, labour supply increases as a result of the lower
wedge made possible by the buffer fund. Eventually, labour participation decreases
again as a consequence of the general increase in the consumption of goods and
leisure.
Fig. 11 makes clear that the introduction of AOW contribution smoothing has a
substantial impact on welfare. Older participants in the labour force pay a higher
contribution than under the baseline and are worse off, while younger generations
for most of their working life pay a lower contribution and benefit from the reform.
In addition, households that have not yet retired suffer a capital loss on their shares.
This loss results from the initial fall of labour supply, which causes a temporary
drop in the return to physical capital. Retired households escape this unexpected
capital loss, since they sold their shares when retiring. In the long run, all individuals
profit from the reduction in the efficiency losses that results from a constant AOW
contribution rate.
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In contrast to the other reforms, the calculation of the ‘marginal cost of funds’ is not useful in this
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variant. This reform does not aim at a reduction of AOW outlays but at a more even distribution of
contributions over generations.1010 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Table 2
AOW contribution rate (in %)
Scenario 2001 Peak Peak reached in 2100
Baseline 8.0 14.8 2039 13.8
Grey 8.1 18.1 2100 18.1
Green 7.9 12.9 2038 10.1
Reduction AOW benefit 7.3 13.5 2039 12.6
Increase retirement age 8.0 13.3 2040 12.3
AOW smoothing 11.4 11.4 All 11.4
Table 3
Public health care contribution rate in % (incl. AWBZ contribution rate)
Scenario 2001 Peak Peak reached in 2100
Baseline 10.0 12.8 2042 12.1
Grey 10.9 14.0 2045 13.8
Green 9.0 11.6 2040 10.9
Reduction AOW benefit 10.0 12.9 2042 12.1
Increase retirement age 10.0 12.8 2042 12.1
AOW smoothing 10.1 12.7 2045 12.1
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we explore the budgetary and economic consequences of the
population ageing in the Netherlands. The baseline projections of the CBS suggest
an almost doubling of the old-age dependency ratio between now and its peak in
2037. There is non-negligible uncertainty about these future demographic develop-
ments and alternative assumptions about the future fertility rate or the development
of the life expectancy have substantial effects on the old-age dependency ratio.
The increase in the relative number of elderly has serious consequences for the
AOW and the public health sector, whose baseline shares of GDPrise by 4.5 and
3.1 percentage points, respectively, between now and their peaks. Tables 2 and 3
summarise the numerical consequences of the population projections for the various
contribution rates. The reported changes in the contribution rates translate directly
into the marginal wedge and indicate how the incentive to supply labour is affected
by the costs associated with population ageing.
We analyse the consequences of population ageing under a baseline scenario and
two demographic variants. The results, in particular the sign of the welfare effects
of ageing, are shown to be sensitive to the demographic projection employed. We
also analyse the consequences of three reforms of the pension sector aimed at
thwarting the adverse consequences of ageing: a reduction in AOW benefits (that
is, a partial shift from public to private pensions), an increase in the retirement age
and AOW contribution smoothing. The social security reforms discussed in this
paper are all beneficial from an efficiency point of view. Of course, the efficiency
gains are larger, the earlier these reforms are implemented. The reforms also have1011 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
intergenerational redistribution effects. In particular, they all shift part of the ageing
costs from the future generations to the retired or the older participants in the labour
market, although the specific time profiles of these redistributions vary across the
reforms.
While our economic model is rich in institutional detail and fully microfounded,
a number of elements potentially relevant in the context of population ageing are
missing. In particular, participation in the labour market is the outcome of carefully
chosen time profiles for the preference parameters rather than the result of
institutional features or frictions. Therefore, the next step in this research project is
to extend the model in such a way that unemployment and labour market (non-)
participation are directly related to these factors. With this extension, one can
investigate what policy alternatives are most suitable for alleviating the ageing
problem by stimulating labour market participation.
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Appendix A: Values of important parameters
Preferences:
Rate of time preference s2% (a year)
Elasticity of substitution between tradables and leisurey s0.66
health care index
Elasticity of substitution between leisure and health care s0.65
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution s0.25
Technology:
Labour saving technological progress s2% (a year)
Technical depreciation rate of capital s11.5% (a year)
Cost share of capital in tradables s36.3%
Cost share of labour in tradables s38.8%
Cost share of raw materials in tradables s24.9%
Elasticity of substitution between raw materials and s0.5
value added in tradables
Elasticity of substitution between capital and labour s0.5
in tradables
Institutional:
Fiscal depreciation rate of capital s5.5% (a year)
Fiscal lifespan of capital goods s13 years
Number of years between entering labour force and s47
entitlement basic pension
AWBZ expenses as fraction of health consumption s0.77
Dividend tax rate sTax rate on labour income
Tax rate on capital gains s0%
Consumption tax rate s25%
Tax rate on interest income households s0.5=Tax rate on labour income1012 R. Beetsma et al. / Economic Modelling 20 (2003) 987–1013
Maximum total pension benefits s70% of final pay
Other:
Real interest rate (baseline) s5%
Debtycapital ratio (in tradable goods sector) s0.5
Maximum lifespan individual s100 years
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